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The price of anarchy (PoA) has been established as a standard measure to quantify the inefficiency
of equilibria in congestion games, in particular in routing games. Most publications have focussed
on worst case bounds for the PoA, only a few have analyzed the sensitivity of the PoA w.r.t.
changes of the traffic demand or cost functions, although that seems to be crucial for empirical
computations of the PoA in real traffic networks.
We introduce a framework to analyze the sensitivity of the PoA in arbitrary non-atomic congestion
games w.r.t. changes of the demand and/or the cost functions. The key to this analysis is a natural
metric for the distance between two games with the same combinatorial structure that inherits
the standard metrics for functions and vectors.
In this setting, we show first that the PoA is a continuous function of the demands and cost
functions, which generalizes a recent result by [9]. We then derive several sensitivity results for the
PoA. For games Γ1 and Γ2 with Lipschitz continuous cost functions and distance ||Γ1 − Γ2|| ≤ ǫ,
the difference between their PoAs ρ(Γi), i = 1, 2, is in the order of the square root of the distance
between the two games, i.e., |ρ(Γ1) − ρ(Γ2)| ∈ O(
√
ǫ). For cost functions that have positive
first-order derivatives, we obtain the stronger result that |ρ(Γ1) − ρ(Γ2)| ∈ O(ǫ). These results
show that small deviations of cost functions and/or demands cause only small deviations of the
PoA, i.e., the PoA is insensitive to small disturbances of the data in real traffic networks and
other non-atomic congestion games.
In addition, we apply our approach to the convergence analysis of the PoA when the total
demand T (d) approaches 0 or ∞. We show that the PoA equals 1 + O(T (d)) when T (d) is
small. For cost functions of the form ζa · xβ · lnα(x + 1), we obtain that the PoA is of order
1+O(
√
1/T (d)) when T (d) is large. This complements recent results by [8, 6, 7] and [36, 38, 37]
on the convergence of the PoA.
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1 Introduction
As reported by [2] and [1], traffic congestion has not only considerably enlarged travel latency in many
cities of China, but also caused serious economic losses. It is thus of great importance to quantify how
much traffic conditions would improve if the users would follow the socially optimal routing pattern
instead of letting them selfishly choose their quickest route.
This has been studied intensively during the last two decades, both in routing networks and the
more general (atomic and non-atomic) congestion games, see, e.g., [19]. Selfish routing leads to a
Wardrop equilibrium ([35]) in routing games. The ratio between its cost and the socially optimal cost
is known as the price of anarchy (PoA), see [16], and measures the inefficiency of selfish routing.
However, modeling traffic in practice is a complex task. The real travel demands are usually hard
to measure accurately since they may fluctuate within a certain range during the day. Also the actual
latency on a street is almost impossible to obtain, and usually modeled by a flow-dependent cost
function that is estimated empirically from real traffic data. Thus modeling errors will inevitably
occur and may influence the resulting PoA in empirical computations.
This raises the natural question how sensitive the PoA is against small data disturbances and asks
for a sensitivity analysis of the PoA.
First results of this type have been obtained by [13], [34], and [9].
[13] showed that the increase of the PoA in single-commodity routing networks is bounded by a
factor of (1 + ǫ) · β from above, when the travel demand is increased by a factor of 1 + ǫ and the cost
functions are polynomials of degree at most β. This has recently been generalized by [34] to multi-
commodity routing networks when the demand changes by the same factor 1 + ǫ for all commodities.
[9] also considered single-commodity routing networks and affine linear or BPR cost functions ([5]).
They showed, among others, that the PoA then becomes a univariate function of the demand d that
is continuous, differentiable and eventually decreasing, thus also providing a sensitivity result for this
case.
1.1 Our contribution
For a general sensitivity analysis of the PoA we need to consider the PoA as a “function” ρ(·) of the
demands and the cost functions. To this end, we need to define a metric that measures the distance
between any two games with the same combinatorial structure (i.e., the same network, commodities
and strategies) but different demands and cost functions.
We do this by using the standard metrics for vectors and functions. Two vectors d = (dk)k∈K and
d′ = (d′k)k∈K have the distance ||d− d′|| ≤ ǫ iff |dk − d′k| ≤ ǫ for all k, and two real valued functions τ
and σ have the distance ||τ − σ|| ≤ ǫ iff |τ(x)− σ(x)| ≤ ǫ for all x in their domain.
These metrics define a natural topology on the set of games with the same combinatorial structure,
see Section 3, and enable us to study the PoA as a real-valued function of pairs (τ, d) that consist of
a vector τ = (τa)a∈A of cost functions τa for the arcs a of the network and a vector d = (dk)k∈K of
demands dk for the different commodities k.
We then show first that the PoA ρ(·) is a continuous function of (τ, d), see Theorem 1. Thus the
deviation |ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| of the PoA of the games Γ and Γ′ will be small when the distance ||Γ−Γ′|| of
the two games is not large. This generalizes the recent result about the continuity of the PoA by [9],
and explains the continuous curve of the empirical PoA reported by [37] for traffic in Beijing.
Our first sensitivity result then shows that |ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ∈ O(√||Γ− Γ′||) when all cost functions
are Lipschitz continuous, see Theorem 2 and Corollary 1. This is the first sensitivity result that
considers simultaneous variations of demands and cost functions.
When the cost functions have positive first order derivatives, then we obtain the stronger sensitivity
result that |ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ∈ O(||Γ− Γ′||), see Theorem 3.
Our results apply directly to the convergence analysis of the PoA when the total demand T (d) tends
to 0 or∞. For arbitrary cost functions τa(·) with τa(0) > 0, Theorem 3 implies that ρ(Γ) = 1+O(T (d))
when T (d) is small, see Corollary 2. This complements a convergence result by [6] for light traffic.
Moreover, when T (d) is large, then Theorem 2 implies that ρ(Γ) = 1+O(
√
1/ ln T (d)) for regularly
varying ([4]) cost functions of the form ζa·xβ ·lnα(x+1), β > 0, α ≥ 0, see Corollary 3. This convergence
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rate is the first one for regularly varying functions that are not polynomials.
Altogether, our results establish the first sensitivity analysis of the PoA for simultaneous changes
of demands and cost functions in multi-commodity routing networks. They also generalize to arbitrary
non-atomic congestion games.
1.2 Related work
[16] proposed to quantify the inefficiency of equilibria in arbitrary congestion games from a worst-case
perspective. This resulted in the concept of the price of anarchy (PoA) that is usually defined as the
ratio of cost of the worst case Nash equilibrium over the cost of the social optimum, see [21].
A wave of research has been started with the pioneering paper of [24] on the PoA of routing
networks with affine linear cost functions. Examples are [25, 26, 29, 27, 28, 11, 10]. They investigated
the worst-case upper bound of the PoA for different types of cost functions τa(·), and analyzed the
influence of the network topology on this bound. In particular, they showed that this bound is 43 when
all τa(·) are affine linear ([24]), and Θ(ρ/ ln ρ) when all τa(·) are polynomials with maximum degree
ρ > 0 ([29] and [28]). Moreover, they proved that this bound is independent of the network topology,
see, e.g., [26]. They also developed a (λ, µ)-smooth method by which one can obtain a tight and robust
worst-case upper bound of the PoA for a large class of cost functions, see, e.g., [26], [29] and [28]. This
method was then reproved by [10] from a geometric perspective. Moreover, [22] considered worst-case
upper bounds for non-separable cost functions. See [30] for a comprehensive overview of the early
development of that research.
Recent papers have also empirically studied the PoA in traffic networks with BPR cost functions
and real data. [39] observed that the empirical PoA depends crucially on the total travel demand.
Starting from 1, it grows with some oscillations, and ultimately becomes 1 again as the total demand
increases. A similar observation was made by [20]. They also conjectured that the PoA converges to 1
in the power law 1+O
(
T (d)−2·β
)
when the total travel demand T (d) becomes large. [18] showed that
routing choices of commuting students in Singapore are near-optimal and that the empirical PoA is
much smaller than known worst-case upper bounds. Similar observations have been reported by [14].
These empirical observations have been confirmed recently by [8, 6, 7] and [36, 38, 37]. [8, 6, 7]
showed for routing games with mutually comparable regularly varying cost functions that the PoA
converges to 1 as the total demand T (d) tends to∞ when all demands dk grow at the same rate. Under
these conditions, they obtained a convergence rate of 1 + O(1/T (d)) for polynomial cost functions.
They also illustrated that the PoA need not converge to 1 when the cost functions are not regularly
varying. Moreover, they showed for analytic cost functions that the PoA converges to 1 as the total
demand T (d) tends to 0 when all demands dk decline to 0 at the same rate.
[36, 38, 37] extended the study of [8, 6, 7] by a new framework. They showed for non-atomic
congestion games with arbitrary regularly varying functions that the PoA converges to 1 as the total
demand tends to ∞ regardless of the growth pattern of the demands. In particular, they proved a
convergence rate of O(T (d)−β) for BPR cost functions and illustrated by examples that the conjecture
proposed by [20] need not hold.
The closest to this paper is the work by [13], [34], and [9].
[13] showed that the increase of the PoA in single-commodity networks is bounded by a factor of
(1 + ǫ) · β from above, when the travel demand is increased by a factor of 1+ ǫ and the cost functions
are polynomials of degree at most β. They actually investigated the sensitivity of Wardrop equilibria
and path latencies, and obtained the result for the PoA by combining their sensitivity results with the
well-known upper bound on the PoA for polynpmials by [26]. They also provided a counterexample
that their results do not hold for multi-commodity networks when the demand can change differently
for different commodities.
These results have recently been generalzed by [34] to multi-commodity networks when the demand
changes by the same factor 1 + ǫ for all commodities.
[9] also considered single-commodity networks and affine linear or BPR cost functions. They
showed that the PoA then becomes a univariate function of the demand d that is continuous, differ-
entiable and eventually decreasing, thus also providing a sensitivity result for this case. They actually
focused on an analysis of the break points of the PoA. These are demand values at which the set
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of paths used by all Wardrop equilibria changes. Their main result shows that the number of break
points is finite, but can be exponential in the size of the network. Their result that the PoA function
is continuous, differentiable and eventually decreasing is a conclusion of their breakpoint analysis.
1.3 Outline of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. We develop our approach for general non-atomic congestion games.
These are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 defines the metrics and the topological space for games
with the same combinatorial structure. Section 4 then presents our techniques and main results. We
conclude with a short summary and discussion in Section 5. To improve readability, all proofs have
been moved to an Appendix.
2 Model and preliminaries
2.1 The model
A non-atomic congestion game Γ consists of a finite non-empty set K of groups k ∈ K of players or
users who compete for a finite set A of resources, see, e.g., [12] and [23]. Herein, every group k ∈ K
has a demand dk ≥ 0, and must satisfy that by choosing one or more strategies s from a finite set
Sk of candidate strategies that are only available to group k. Strategies s ∈ S :=
⋃
k∈K Sk are non-
empty subsets of A, and users of group k distribute their demand to the strategies s ∈ Sk in arbitrary
quantities fs ≥ 0, and so dk =
∑
s∈Sk
fs.
Users choose their strategies independently, and their joint decisions result in a strategy profile or
simply profile f = (fs)s∈S . So the joint consumption of resource a ∈ A is obtained as fa :=
∑
s∈S:a∈s fs.
Technically, the term non-atomic means that the demand dk is arbitrarily splittable, which is usually
interpreted that each individual user is too infinitesimal to influence others.
Competition happens through the cost of jointly consumed resources. We assume that each re-
source a ∈ A has a non-negative, non-decreasing and continuous cost function τa(·), depending only on
its joint consumption fa. Then, the cost of a strategy s ∈ S under profile f is τs(f) :=
∑
a∈A:a∈s τa(fa),
and the (social) cost of profile f or the total cost of users is
∑
k∈K
∑
s∈Sk
fs · τs(f) =
∑
a∈A fa · τa(fa).
We illustrate these notions on routing games below.
Example 1 (Routing games) Routing games are used to model static traffic in networks, see, e.g.,
[31]. In a routing game, we are given a directed graph G = (V,A) (the traffic network), and origin-
destination (O/D) pairs (ok, tk) with (traffic) demands dk, k ∈ K. This defines a non-atomic congestion
game Γ as follows.
The groups of Γ are the O/D pairs, the demand of group k is dk, the resources are the arcs in
A, the cost function τa(·) is the latency function of arc a ∈ A, the strategies of group k ∈ K are
the (ok, tk)-paths leading from the origin ok to the destination tk, a strategy profile f = (fs)s∈S is
a multi-commodity flow satisfying the demands dk, and fs is the flow value along path s. The joint
consumption fa of resource a ∈ A is the flow value of arc a. Finally, τs(f) =
∑
a∈A:a∈s τa(fa) is the
total latency along path s ∈ S, and the total cost ∑a∈A fa · τa(fa) is the total latency of flow f in the
network.
We write a non-atomic congestion game Γ as a tuple (K, A,S, τ, d), and simply call such a tuple a
game. Herein, K is the finite non-empty set of groups, A is the finite non-empty set of resources, Sk
is the finite non-empty strategy set for group k ∈ K, S = ⋃k∈K Sk, τ = (τa(·))a∈A is the vector of cost
functions, and d = (dk)k∈K is the demand vector, i.e., the vector of demands dk.
To study the sensitivity of the PoA in a game Γ, we will fix the three components K, A and
S of Γ, and consider varying vectors (τ, d) of cost functions and demands. We call (K, A,S) the
combinatorial structure of Γ and denote by G(K, A,S) the collection of all games with the same
combinatorial structure. Equipped with a topology, we will call G(K, A,S) the game space below.
When the combinatorial structure is given, then we will just denote a game from G(K, A,S) by its
vector (τ, d).
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To avoid ambiguity, we denote by C(f, τ) the total cost of a profile f w.r.t. τ , i.e., C(f, τ) :=∑
k∈K
∑
s∈Sk
fs · τs(f) =
∑
a∈A fa · τa(fa). This notation shows explicitly the dependence of the total
cost on τ = (τa)a∈A. Here, it is not necessary to specify the demand vector d = (dk)k∈K because d is
determined by the profile f as dk =
∑
s∈Sk
fs for all k ∈ K.
2.2 Equilibria, optimality and the price of anarchy
A profile with minimum cost is called a social optimum of Γ = (τ, d), abbreviated as SO profile. Such
a profile f∗ is considered as an ideal state of the game Γ, as C(f∗, τ) ≤ C(f, τ) for each profile f
of Γ, and so resources are consumed in the globally most efficient way. Since the cost functions are
continuous, non-decreasing and non-negative, every non-atomic congestion game has an SO profile.
Users choose their strategies s ∈ S selfishly and want to minimize their own cost τs(f). Under the
above conditions of the cost functions, this leads to a Wardrop equilibrium ([35]) f˜ = (f˜s)s∈S in which
every group k uses only strategies fulfilling Equation (2.1) below.
∀k ∈ K ∀s, s′ ∈ Sk
(
f˜s > 0 =⇒ τs(f˜) ≤ τs′(f˜)
)
. (2.1)
Equation (2.1) means that Wardrop equilibria satisfy a “user optimality condition”, i.e.,
∀k ∈ Sk ∀s ∈ Sk : f˜s > 0 =⇒ τs(f˜) = Lk(τ, d) := min
s′∈Sk
τs′(f˜). (2.2)
We call the constant Lk(τ, d) in Equation (2.2) the user cost of group k ∈ K. The notation Lk(τ, d)
indicates again the dependence of the user cost on the cost function vector τ = (τa)a∈A and the
demand vector d = (dk)k∈K.
Wardrop equilibria need not be unique. However, different Wardrop equilibria have the same
resource cost, i.e., τa(f˜a) = τa(f˜
′
a) for each a ∈ A for any two Wardrop equilibria f˜ and f˜ ′ of Γ, see,
e.g., [32], [33] and [24]. So, all Wardrop equilibria have the same user cost Lk(τ, d) for a group k ∈ K
and thus the same total cost C(f˜ , τ).
Wardrop equilibria are pure Nash equilibria of Γ from a game-theoretic perspective. This follows
since the cost functions are continuous, non-decreasing and non-negative, see, e.g., [24]. We will
therefore denote them as NE profiles in the sequel.
When all cost functions τa(·) are differentiable, an SO profile f∗ is also an NE profile w.r.t. the
marginal cost functions ca(x) = x · τ ′a(x)+ τa(x), and, vice versa, an NE profile is an SO profile for the
cost functions 1x
∫ x
0 τa(ξ)dξ, see, e.g., [3, 24]. Hence, if the cost functions are monomials of the same
degree β ≥ 0, then SO profiles coincide with NE profiles.
In the sequel, f˜ and f∗ will always denote an NE profile and an SO profile, respectively.
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) for demand vector d and cost function vector τ is defined as the ratio
of the worst cost of a NE profile over the optimum cost. Since all NE profiles have the same cost in
our case, the PoA is thus given by
ρ(τ, d) :=
C(f˜ , τ)
C(f∗, τ)
=
∑
s∈S f˜s · τs(f˜)∑
s∈S f
∗
s · τs(f∗)
∈ [1,∞]. (2.3)
Again, this notation indicates the dependence of the PoA on τ = (τa)a∈A, and d = (dk)k∈K.
2.3 Potential functions and ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria
Our games are actually potential games see, e.g., [23] and [17]. Their potential functions are defined
by
Φ(f, τ) =
∑
a∈A
∫ fa
0
τa(x) dx (2.4)
see also the definition in [19]. Herein, f = (fs)s∈S is a profile of a game (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S), and Φ(f, τ)
reaches its global minimum Φ∗(τ, d) only if f is an Nash equilibrium, see, e.g., [24] for an alternative
definition. So, Φ(f, τ) − Φ∗(τ, d) = Φ(f, τ) − Φ(f˜ , τ) measures the potential difference that can be
achieved by choosing a better profile than f.
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We call a profile f an ǫ-approximate NE profile for a small constant ǫ > 0, if
∑
a∈A τa(fa)·(fa−ga) <
ǫ for all a ∈ A and every profile g = (gs)s∈S , see, e.g., [24]. The constant ǫ is called the approximation
quality of profile f.
Lemma 1 shows some important properties of ǫ-approximate NE profiles. Lemma 1a) follows triv-
ially from the definition. Lemma 1b) follows directly from the fact that τa(x) · (y−x) ≤
∫ y
x τa(z) dz ≤
τa(y) · (y − x) for all triples (a, x, y) ∈ A × R2≥0. Herein, R≥0 := [0,∞). This holds because ev-
ery cost function τa(·) is non-decreasing, non-negative and continuous. For Lemma 1b), we obtain
0 ≤∑a∈A τa(f˜a) · (fa − f˜a) because f˜ fulfills the user optimality condition (2.2), see also, e.g., [24].
Lemma 1c) is a direct consequence of Lemma 1b). It proves an approximation bound when all cost
functions are Lipschitz continuous. Recall that a cost function h(·) is Lipschitz continuous (or simply
Lipschitz) on a closed interval I ⊆ [0,∞) if there is a constant M > 0 s.t. |h(x)− h(y)| ≤M · |x− y|
for all x, y ∈ I. Such a constant M is called a Lipschitz constant for h(·).
Lemma 1 Consider a game (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S) and a constant ǫ > 0. Let f be an ǫ-approximate NE
profile, and let f˜ be an NE profile. Then f and f˜ fulfill the following conditions.
a) For each k ∈ K, 0 ≤ 1dk ·
∑
s∈Sk
τs(f) · fs −mins∈Sk τs(f) < ǫ.
b) 0 ≤ ∑a∈A τa(f˜a) · (fa − f˜a) ≤ Φ(f, τ) − Φ(f˜ , τ) ≤ ∑a∈A τa(fa) · (fa − f˜a) < ǫ, and thus 0 ≤∑
a∈A |τa(fa)− τa(f˜a)| · |fa − f˜a| < ǫ.
c) If every τa(·) is Lipschitz continuous on [0, T (d)] with Lipschitz constant M > 0, then |τa(fa)−
τa(f˜a)| <
√
M · ǫ for all a ∈ A.
Lemma 1a) shows that the average user cost τ¯k(f) :=
1
dk
·∑s∈Sk τs(f) ·fs is very close to the minimum
cost τ∗k (f) := mins∈Sk τs(f) if f is an ǫ-approximate NE profile for a small ǫ. Lemma 1b) shows that
ǫ-approximate NE profiles and NE profiles have very close potential values. Lemma 1c) is particularly
interesting. It states that an ǫ-approximate NE profile and an arbitrary NE profile have very close
resource costs when ǫ is small. We will use this later in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1.
2.4 Well designed games and asymptotically well designed games
We obtain a subclass G(K, A,S, τ) of the class G(K, A,S) of all games with the same combinatorial
structure (K, A,S) when we fix the vector τ = (τa)a∈A of cost functions and allow only changes of the
demand vector d = (dk)k∈K.
There are vectors τ = (τa)a∈A of cost functions s.t. every game in G(K, A,S, τ) has a PoA of 1,
i.e., ρ(τ, d) = 1 for all demand vectors d. Games with such cost functions were called well designed
in [37]. Examples are games given by vectors τ = (τa)a∈A of monomial cost functions τa(·) with the
same degree β ≥ 0.
Vectors τ = (τa)a∈A with well designed games (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S, τ) are rare. Instead, one can
consider vectors τ = (τa)a∈A s.t. limn→∞ ρ(τ, d
(n)) = 1 for arbitrary sequences of games (τ, d(n)) ∈
G(K, A,S, τ) fulfilling limn→∞ T (d(n)) = ∞ w.r.t the total demand T (d(n)) :=
∑
k∈K d
(n)
k for vector
d(n) = (d
(n)
k )k∈K. Games with such cost functions were called asymptotically well designed in [37].
Obviously, equilibria of these games are not bad for high demands.
[37] showed that games with regularly varying cost functions are asymptotically well designed.
This class of games is quite extensive and contains, e.g., all games with polynomials, logarithms, and
their finite sums and/or products as cost functions. We will prove a new result on the convergence
rate of the PoA for this class in Section 4.3.
3 Scaling, metrics and limits
3.1 The game space
When the total demand T (d) =
∑
k∈K dk = 0, then C(f˜ , τ) = C(f
∗, τ) = 0, and so ρ(τ, d) = 00 , which
is undefined. In fact, even if the total demand T (d) is positive, the PoA may still be undefined when
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we permit τa(x) = 0 for some x > 0 and some a ∈ A, i.e., when some resources a ∈ A are free to use.
Example 2 below illustrates this on a simple routing game.
Example 2 (The PoA may be undefined) Consider a routing game Γ with the network shown in
Figure 1. Γ has one O/D pair (i.e., one group) and three parallel arcs (i.e., three strategies) with cost
functions τ1(·), τ2(·) and τ3(·), respectively. Suppose that Γ has a total travel demand T (d) = 1. Let
o τ3(·) t
τ1(·)
τ2(·)
Figure 1: Routing game with undefined PoA
τ3(x) ≡ 0.5, and
τ1(x) = τ2(x) =
{
0 if x ≤ 0.5,
x− 0.5 if x > 0.5, for all x ≥ 0.
Then the SO profile and the NE profile coincide and have a total cost of zero. Hence, the PoA of game
Γ is undefined.
To avoid this and other undefined cases, we assume in the sequel that the total demand is positive
(T (d) > 0), that no resource is free (i.e., τa(x) > 0 for all (a, x) ∈ A × (0,∞)), that every strategy s
contains a resource a, and that every resource a is contained in a strategy s. The last two conditions
can obviously be required w.o.l.g., as resources a ∈ A with a /∈ s for all s ∈ S and strategies s ∈ S
with s = ∅ play no role.
From now on, the term “game” will refer to a pair (τ = (τa)a∈A, d = (dk)k∈K) that fulfills all above
conditions. We shall call the class G(K, A,S) of these games the game space.
Lemma 2 below shows that games Γ ∈ G(K, A,S) have a well defined PoA. The proof is trivial
and omitted.
Lemma 2 Consider an arbitrary game Γ = (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S). Let f, f˜ and f∗ be an arbitrary profile,
an NE profile and an SO profile of Γ, respectively. Then fa ∈ [0, T (d)] for all a ∈ A,
0 <
T (d)
|S| ·mina∈A τa
(T (d)
|S|
)
≤ C(f∗, τ) ≤ C(f˜ , τ) ≤ |A| · T (d) ·max
a∈A
τa
(
T (d)
)
,
and ρ(τ, d) ∈ [1,∞).
3.2 Scaling and ρ-invariant transformations
A transformation Q : G(K, A,S) → G(K, A,S) is called ρ-invariant, if it does not change the PoA,
i.e., ρ(Γ) = ρ
(
Q(Γ)
)
for each game Γ ∈ G(K, A,S), see the commuting diagram in Figure 2 below.
G(K, A,S) G(K, A,S)
PoA ∈ [1,∞)
Q(Γ)
ρ(Γ) ρ
(
Q(Γ)
)
Figure 2: The commuting diagram of a ρ-invariant transformation Q(·)
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Examples of ρ-invariant transformations are the scaling transformations used recently in [6, 7]
and [37]. There are two elementary such scaling transformations: cost scaling and demand scaling.
Cost scaling refers to a transformation πw : G(K, A,S) → G(K, A,S) such that πw(Γ) = πw(τ, d) =
(τ/w, d) for every game Γ = (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S). Herein, w > 0 is a cost scaling factor, and τ/w :=(
τa(x)/w
)
a∈A
.
Demand scaling refers to a transformation δw : G(K, A,S) → G(K, A,S) such that δw(Γ) =
δw(τ, d) = (τ ◦ w, d/w) for every game Γ = (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S). Herein, w > 0 is a demand scal-
ing factor, d/w :=
(
dk/w
)
k∈K
, and τ ◦ w := (τa(w · x))a∈A.
Clearly, compositions of ρ-invariant transformations are also ρ-invariant. In the sequel, we will
use frequently compositions of the type πw1 ◦ δw2(τ, d) =
(
(τ ◦ w2)/w1, d/w2
)
for a cost scaling factor
w1 > 0 and a demand scaling factor w2 > 0.
We denote by L the set of all non-decreasing and continuous functions h : R≥0 → R≥0, by LA the
set of all vectors τ = (τa)a∈A with components τa ∈ L, and by RK≥0 the set of all vectors d = (dk)k∈K
with components dk ≥ 0.
Using demand scaling, a game Γ = (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S) transforms to a game Γ′ = (σ, d′) ∈
G(K, A,S) with total demand T (d′) = 1 and ρ(Γ) = ρ(Γ′). We call Nor(G(K, A,S)) := {(τ, d) : τ ∈
LA, d ∈ RK≥0 with T (d) =
∑
k∈K dk = 1
}∩G(K, A,S) the normalized game space and call its elements
normalized games. Obviously, we need to consider only normalized games Γ ∈Nor(G(K, A,S)) when
we investigate properties of the PoA.
Profiles f =
(
fs
)
s∈S
of a game Γ = (τ, d) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)) have fs ∈ [0, 1] for each s ∈ S.
Thus the joint consumption fa =
∑
s∈S:a∈s fs ∈ [0, 1] for every resource a ∈ A. Since [0, 1] is com-
pact, a function h(·) is continuous on the interval [0, 1] iff it is uniformly continuous on the in-
terval [0, 1], i.e., for each ǫ > 0, there is a constant η > 0 such that |h(x) − h(x′)| < ǫ for all
x, x′ ∈ [0, 1] with |x − x′| < η. So we can identify L with the set C[0, 1] := {h | h : [0, 1] →
R≥0 is uniformly continuous and non-decreasing
}
when we discuss games in Nor(G(K, A,S)), since
the values of cost functions τa(·) on the unbounded interval (1,∞) play no role in this case.
For a compact domain, uniform continuity and Lipschitz continuity are very close. Every Lipschtiz
continuous function is uniformly continuous, and, vice versa, every uniformly continuous function on
a compact domain can be represented as the limit of a sequence of functions that are Lipschitz
continuous on that domain. So we will focus on Lipschitz continuous cost functions when we analyze
the sensitivity of the PoA of games in Nor(G(K, A,S)).
3.3 A topology on the normalized game space and the limit of sequences of games
We can define a metric Dist : Nor(G(K, A,S)) × Nor(G(K, A,S)) → R≥0 on Nor(G(K, A,S)) by
putting
Dist(Γ,Γ′) := max
{
||τ − σ|| =
∑
a∈A
∑
x∈[0,1]
|τa(x)− σa(x)|,
∑
k∈K
|dk − d′k|
}
(3.1)
for two arbitrary games Γ = (τ, d),Γ′ = (σ, d′) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)). This metric quantifies the “dis-
tance” between games inNor(G(K, A,S)). With this metric, Nor(G(K, A,S)) becomes a metric space.
In the sequel, we will simply write ||Γ− Γ′|| instead of Dist(Γ,Γ′).
Using this metric, we can now define the limit of a sequence of games (Definition 1) and continuity
of maps (Definition 2) in the usual way for metric spaces.
Definition 1 (Limit game) Let (Γ(n))n∈N be a sequence of games Γ
(n) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)). We call
a game Γ ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)) the limit game of (Γ(n))n∈N, denoted by limn→∞ Γ(n) = Γ, if for each
ǫ > 0, there is an N ∈ N such that ||Γ− Γ(n)|| < ǫ for all n ≥ N.
Note that the notion of limit game was first proposed by [36, 38, 37]. They focused on the
convergence analysis of the PoA. They thus defined only limit games for sequences of games (τ, d(n))
with total demand T (d(n)) → ∞ and imposed additionally that the limit game has a PoA of 1. We
generalize this notion here and consider limit games for arbitrary sequences of games. So neither need
the total demand of a sequence tend to ∞, nor need the limit game have a PoA of 1.
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Definition 2 (Continuous map) A real-valued map ϕ : G(K, A,S) → R is continuous, if ϕ(Γ(n)) =
ϕ(Γ) for every sequence
(
Γ(n)
)
n∈N
⊆ Nor(G(K, A,S)) with limn→∞ Γ(n) = Γ ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)).
The metric (3.1) induces a point-wise topology on Nor(G(K, A,S)), see [15]. Thus the limit in
Definition 1 and the continuity in Definition 2 are also point-wise. In particular, this topology is
Hausdorff (see [15]) and every convergent game sequence thus has exactly one limit game. Moreover,
limn→∞ Γ
(n) = Γ iff limn→∞ τ
(n)
a (x) = τa(x) for all (a, x) ∈ A × [0, 1] and limn→∞ d(n)k = dk for all
k ∈ K.
In fact, we can extend this point-wise topology to the whole game space G(K, A,S), and define
limit and continuity on G(K, A,S) in the standard topological way. However, the metric Dist(·, ·)
cannot be generalized to G(K, A,S), see Remark 1 below.
Remark 1 (An extension of the topology to G(K, A,S)) Denote by G(K, A,S) the product space
LA × RK≥0. Then Nor(G(K, A,S)) ( G(K, A,S) ( G(K, A,S). Associated with G(K, A,S) is a point-
wise topology T generated from the basis B = B1
⋃B2, where B1 consists of all open balls L(a, x, b, ǫ) =
{(τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S) : |τa(x)− b| < ǫ} for every tuple (a, x, b, ǫ) ∈ A×R3≥0, and B2 consists of all open
balls D(k, b, ǫ) = {(τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S) : |dk − b| < ǫ} for every tuple (k, b, ǫ) ∈ K × R2≥0.
The topology on Nor(G(K, A,S)) induced by the metric is a restriction of T to the subspace
Nor(G(K, A,S)). We call the space G(K, A,S) the generalized game space and its elements gener-
alized games. The game space G(K, A,S) ⊆ G(K, A,S) is then a dense open subspace of T .
Limits and continuity can be directly defined on G(K, A,S) w.r.t. the topology T in the stan-
dard topological way, see [15]. This then generalizes these two notions from Nor(G(K, A,S)) to
the game space G(K, A,S). However, the topology T is not metrizable, although its restriction on
Nor(G(K, A,S)) is. This follows since LA does not have a second-countable basis, see [15] for a
detailed explanation.
Example 2 above illustrates that the PoA may be undefined for a generalized game, while Example 3
below shows in addition that the well defined PoA on G(K, A,S) also cannot be extended by taking limits
to the generalized game space G(K, A,S), although G(K, A,S) is dense in G(K, A,S).
4 A sensitivity analysis of the PoA
4.1 The PoA is continuous
Theorem 1 below shows that the PoA is continuous w.r.t. to the metric defined in Section 3.3. The
proof is given in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 1 (Continuity) Consider an arbitrary sequence
(
Γ(n) = (τ (n), d(n))
)
n∈N
inNor(G(K, A,S))
such that limn→∞ Γ
(n) = Γ for some limit game Γ = (τ, d) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)). For each n ∈ N, let
f˜ (n) and f∗(n) be an NE profile and an SO profile of Γ(n), respectively, and let f˜ and f∗ be an NE
profile and an SO profile of Γ, respectively. Then, the following statements hold.
a) If f˜ (∞) =
(
f˜
(∞)
s
)
s∈S
= limi→∞ f˜
(ni) = limi→∞
(
f˜
(ni)
s
)
s∈S
for an infinite subsequence (ni)i∈N,
then f˜ (∞) is an NE profile of the limit game Γ.
b) If f∗(∞) =
(
f
∗(∞)
s
)
s∈S
= limi→∞ f
∗(ni) = limi→∞
(
f
∗(ni)
s
)
s∈S
for an infinite subsequence (ni)i∈N,
then f∗(∞) is an SO profile of the limit game Γ.
c) limn→∞ τ
(n)
a (f˜
(n)
a ) = τa(f˜a) for all a ∈ A.
d) limn→∞C(f˜
(n), τ (n)) = C(f˜ , τ), limn→∞C(f
∗(n), τ (n)) = C(f∗, τ), and limn→∞ ρ(Γ
(n)) = ρ(Γ).
Theorem 1a)–b) imply the convergence of the NE profiles f˜ (n) to f˜ and of the SO profiles f∗(n) to
f∗, respectively, when Γ has a unique NE profile f˜ and a unique SO profile f∗. Theorem 1d) shows
that the NE cost, the SO cost and the PoA are continuous maps.
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The continuity in Theorem 1d) onNor(G(K, A,S)) carries over to the whole game space G(K, A,S)
when we consider the generalized point-wise topology T on G(K, A,S) defined in Remark 1. This
follows by using the demand scaling from Section 3.2.
Recall that the resources of games in the space G(K, A,S) are not free, i.e., τa(x) > 0 for all
(a, x) ∈ A× (0,∞), and that the PoA is well defined only on the game space G(K, A,S), see Lemma 2
and Example 2. One may wonder if the well defined PoA on G(K, A,S) can be extended by taking
limits to “games” permitting the free use of a resource. Example 3 below shows that this is not
possible.
Example 3 (Divergence of the PoA at zero cost) Consider a generalized game Γ (see Remark 1)
and games Γ(n) as shown in Figure 3(a)–(b) below. They are routing games with a single O/D pair
o
τ1(x) ≡ 0
τ2(x) ≡ 0
t
(a) Routing game Γ with T (d) = 1
o
τ
(n)
1 (x) ≡ 1n
τ
(n)
2 (x) =
xβn
n
t
(b) Routing game Γ(n) with T (d(n)) = 1
Figure 3: Divergence of the PoA at zero cost
(o, t) and parallel arcs. Obviously, every profile for the generalized game Γ is both an NE profile and
an SO profile, and has zero cost. So, the PoA of Γ is undefined. For each n ∈ N, let us put τ (n)1 (x) = 1n
and τ
(n)
2 (x) =
xβn
n for some constant βn ≥ 0 defined in (4.1) below.
βn =
{
0 if n is odd,
1 if n is even,
for all n ∈ N. (4.1)
Then limn→∞ Γ
(n) = Γ, i.e., the game sequence
(
Γ(n)
)
n∈N
has the generalized game Γ as its limit.
However, liml→∞ ρ(Γ
(2l+1)) = 1 < liml→∞ ρ(Γ
(2l)) = 43 . Thus the sequence
(
ρ(Γ(n))
)
n∈N
of PoAs
diverges when the cost functions approach the constant zero.
So, a consistent definition of the map PoA at “point” Γ that preserves continuity does not exist.
This shows that the map PoA cannot be extended by taking limits to “games” permitting the free use
of a resource.
4.2 The PoA is insensitive to small variations of demands and cost functions
4.2.1 A sensitivity analysis for general cost functions
Lemma 3 extends Theorem 1 and shows that the SO cost, the NE cost, the potential function, and the
PoA are insensitive w.r.t. ǫ-disturbances of the cost functions. We move its proof to Appendix A.2.
Lemma 3 (Cost sensitivity) Consider a game Γ = (τ, d) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)), and an arbitrary
game Γ′ = (σ, d) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)) s.t. ||Γ− Γ′|| = ||τ − σ|| = maxa∈Amaxx∈[0,1] |τa(x)− σa(x)| = ǫ.
Let f˜ and g˜ be NE profiles of Γ and Γ′, respectively, and let f∗ and g∗ be SO profiles of Γ and Γ′,
respectively. Then, the following statements hold.
a) |C(f∗, τ)−C(g∗, σ)| ≤ ǫ · |A|.
b) |Φ(f, τ) − Φ(f, σ)| ≤ ǫ · |A| for every profile f. Moreover, |Φ(f˜ , τ) − Φ(g˜, σ)| ≤ ǫ · |A|, 0 ≤
Φ(g˜, τ)− Φ(f˜ , τ) ≤ 2 · ǫ · |A|, and 0 ≤ Φ(f˜ , σ)− Φ(g˜, σ) ≤ 2 · ǫ · |A|.
c) f˜ is an ǫ · |A|-approximate NE profile of the game (σ, d), and g˜ is an ǫ · |A|-approximate NE
profile of the game (τ, d), i.e.,
∑
a∈A τa(g˜a) ·(g˜a−fa) ≤ ǫ · |A| and
∑
a∈A σa(f˜a) ·(f˜a−fa) ≤ ǫ · |A|
for each profile f.
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d) If all τa(x) are Lipschitz continuous on [0, 1] with common Lipschitz constant M > 0, then
|C(f˜ , τ)− C(g˜, σ)| ≤√ǫ ·M · |A|3 + 2 · ǫ · |A| and
|ρ(σ, d) − ρ(τ, d)| ≤
√
M · ǫ · |A|3 + (2 + ρ(τ, d)) · ǫ · |A|
C(f∗, τ)− ǫ · |A| ≤
2 ·√M · |A|3
C(f∗, τ)
· √ǫ =: u(M,Γ) · √ǫ
(4.2)
when ǫ is small enough.
Lemma 3c) is particularly interesting. It states that NE profiles of the game (τ, d) approximate
NE profiles of the game (σ, d) with an error at most ǫ · |A|, and vice versa, when ||τ − σ|| = ǫ is
small. This, together with Lemma 1b), implies that 0 ≤ ∑a∈A τa(f˜a) · (g˜a − f˜a) ≤ ǫ · |A|, that
0 ≤∑a∈A σa(g˜a) · (f˜a − g˜a) ≤ ǫ · |A|, and that
0 ≤
∑
a∈A
(
τa(f˜a)− σa(g˜a)
) · (g˜a − f˜a) ≤ 2 · ǫ · |A|,
0 ≤
∑
a∈A
(
τa(g˜a)− τa(f˜a)
) · (g˜a − f˜a) ≤∑
a∈A
(
σa(g˜a)− τa(g˜a)
) · (f˜a − g˜a) ≤ ǫ · |A|,
0 ≤
∑
a∈A
(
σa(g˜a)− σa(f˜a)
) · (g˜a − f˜a) ≤∑
a∈A
(
τa(f˜a)− σa(f˜a)
) · (g˜a − f˜a) ≤ ǫ · |A|.
(4.3)
Note that inequality (4.3) holds for arbitrary cost functions. It thus illustrates a common effect
of the selfish choice of users. Consider for instance the particular case that σa(x) = τa(x) + ǫ for all
pairs (a, x) ∈ A× [0, 1]. Then (4.3) implies that
0 ≤
∑
a∈A
f˜a −
∑
a∈A
g˜a ≤ |A|. (4.4)
For routing games, (4.4) means a better distribution of the congestion over all arcs in the routing
network after an additional deviation of ǫ is imposed per arc, which may be interpreted as adding an
extra toll of ǫ on every arc. Moreover, (4.3) is also helpful to refine the sensitivity results for special
cost functions in Section 4.2.2.
Lemma 4 below continues Lemma 3 and considers the sensitivity of the PoA w.r.t. ǫ-disturbances
of demands. It shows that the PoA is also insensitive in this case. We move the proof to Appendix A.3.
Lemma 4 (Demand sensitivity) Consider two games Γ = (τ, d),Γ′ = (τ, d′) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S))
s.t. all cost functions τa(·) are Lipschitz continuous on [0, 1] with Lipschitz constant M > 0 and
||Γ − Γ′|| = ∑k∈K |dk − d′k| = ǫ for a small ǫ > 0. Let f∗ and g∗ be SO profiles of games Γ = (τ, d)
and Γ′ = (τ, d′), respectively, and let f˜ and g˜ be NE profiles of games Γ = (τ, d) and Γ′ = (τ, d′),
respectively. Then:
a) |C(f˜ , τ)−C(g˜, τ)|≤√ǫ · (√2 ·M2 · |A|3+√ǫ ·maxk∈K Lk(τ, d)), where Lk(τ, d) = mins∈Sk τs(f˜)
is the user cost of group k ∈ K under NE profile f˜ .
b) |C(f∗, τ)−C(g∗, τ)| ≤ ǫ · (∑a∈A τa(f∗a ) + (3 + ǫ) · |A| ·M).
c) |ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ≤ 2·
√
2·M2·|A|3
C(f∗,τ) ·
√
ǫ =: v(M,Γ) · √ǫ when ǫ is small enough.
The upper bounds in (4.2) and Lemma 4a)–c) involve constants C(f∗, d), Lk(τ, d) and τ
∗
a (f
∗
a )
and thus depend on the demand vector d = (dk)k∈K. But we can obtain upper bounds in (4.2)
and Lemma 4a)–c) that are independent of the structure of d. This follows since C(f∗, τ) ≥ 1|S| ·
mina∈A τa(
1
|S|) > 0, see Lemma 2, Lk(τ, d) ≤ |A| · maxa∈A τa(T (d)) ≤ |A| · maxa∈A τa(1) for each
k ∈ K, and τa(f∗a ) ≤ τa(1) for each a ∈ A, where we observe that Γ ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)). Thus
the sensitivity results in Lemmas 3–4 depend crucially on the cost functions τa(·) and the common
combinatorial structure (K, A,S) of games, but not on the structure of demands d = (dk)k∈K.
Using Lemmas 3–4, we can now obtain a compound sensitivity result for the PoA for simultaneous
changes of cost functions and demands. Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 together imply that |ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ∈
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(||Γ− Γ′||1/2) when Γ = (τ, d),Γ′ = (σ, d′) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)) and all τa(·) are Lipschitz continuous
on [0, 1]. This follows directly since |ρ(τ, d) − ρ(τ, d′)| ∈ O(||Γ − Γ′||1/2) and |ρ(τ, d′) − ρ(σ, d′)| ∈
O
(||Γ− Γ′||1/2). We summarize this in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Compound sensitivity) Consider two games Γ = (τ, d),Γ′ = (σ, d′) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S))
s.t. the cost functions of Γ are Lipschitz continuous on [0, 1] with Lipschitz constant M > 0 and
||Γ − Γ′|| = ǫ. Let f˜ and g˜ be NE profiles of games Γ and Γ′, respectively, and let f∗ and g∗ be SO
profiles of games Γ and Γ′, respectively. Then:
a) |C(f˜ , τ)− C(g˜, σ)| ≤ √ǫ ·
(√
2 ·M2 · |A|3 +√M · |A|3+√ǫ · (maxk∈K Lk(τ, d) + 2 · |A|)).
b) |C(f∗, τ)−C(g∗, σ)| ≤ ǫ · (∑a∈A τa(f∗a ) + (3 + ǫ) · |A| ·M + |A|).
c) |ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ≤ (u(M,Γ)+ v(M,Γ)) · √ǫ when ǫ is small, where u(M,Γ) is the constant defined
in Lemma 3c) and v(M,Γ) is the constant defined in Lemma 4c).
As mentioned above, the compound sensitivity results in Theorem 2 also depend crucially on the
cost functions τa(·) and the combinatorial structure (K, A,S) of games. Since we fix the combinatorial
structure (K, A,S) in our discussion, the properties of the cost functions τa(·) of a game Γ = (τ, d) ∈
Nor(G(K, A,S)) then determine the sensitivity of its NE cost, its SO cost and its PoA against small
disturbances of its demands d and/or cost functions τ .
With the demanding scaling δw(·) from Section 3.2, the sensitivity results of Theorem 2 carry
directly over to games in G(K, A,S). Clearly, for a game Γ = (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S) whose cost functions
are Lipschitz continuous on compact intervals and a game Γ′ = (σ, d′) ∈ G(K, A,S) with a small
“distance” ǫ = ||δT (d)(Γ)− δT (d′)(Γ′)|| from Γ, Theorem 2 applies to their normalized games δT (d)(Γ)
and δT (d′)(Γ
′). We summarize this in Corollary 1 below. Here, we observe that the game Γ and its
normalized game δT (d)(Γ) have the same SO cost and the same user cost for each group k ∈ K.
Corollary 1 Consider an arbitrary game Γ = (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S) whose cost functions τa(·) are
Lipschitz continuous on the compact interval [0, T (d)+ξ] with Lipschitz constant M > 0 for a constant
ξ > 0. Then
|ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ≤ [u(M,Γ) + v(M,Γ)] ·√||δT (d)(Γ)− δT (d′)(Γ′)|| (4.5)
for every game Γ′ = (σ, d′) ∈ G(K, A,S) with a small distance ||δT (d)(Γ) − δT (d′)(Γ′)|| from Γ, where
u(M,Γ) is the constant defined in Lemma 3c) and v(M,Γ) is the constant defined in Lemma 4c). In
particular,
|ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ≤ [u(M,Γ)+ v(M,Γ)] ·
√
max
{ 1
T (d)
·
∑
k∈K
|dk − d′k|, M ·
∣∣T (d)− T (d′)∣∣} (4.6)
when σ = τ and
∑
k∈K |dk − d′k| is small.
Note that the constants u(M,Γ) and v(M,Γ) in Corollary 1 are independent of Γ′ and ||δT (d)(Γ)−
δT (d′)(Γ
′)||, and that cost functions in practice are usually continuously differentiable and thus Lips-
chitz continuous on compact intervals. So Corollary 1 shows that the PoAs of games in practice are
insensitive w.r.t. small changes of demands and/or cost functions.
4.2.2 A refined analysis for special cost functions
Consider two games Γ = (τ, d),Γ′ = (σ, d′) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)). We will now derive conditions on the
cost functions τa(·) such that |ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ∈ O(ǫ) when ||Γ− Γ′|| = ǫ for a small constant ǫ > 0.
Inequality (4.3) leads to two classes of continuously differentiable cost functions that permit a
refined sensitivity result, see Theorem 3 below. We move the proof to Appendix A.4.
Theorem 3 (Compound sensitivity for special cost functions) Consider two games Γ = (τ, d),Γ′ =
(σ, d′) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)) with ||Γ− Γ′|| = ǫ for a small ǫ > 0.
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a) (Constant functions) If τa(x) ≡ ca > 0 is constant for all a ∈ A, then |ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| is bounded
from above by
|A| · (2 ·maxa∈A τa(1) + 3)
C(f∗, τ)− ǫ · |A| · (maxa∈A τa(1) + 1) · ǫ.
b) (Functions with positive derivatives) If τ ′a(·) is continuous and τ ′a(x) > 0 for every x ∈ [0, 1] and
all a ∈ A, then |ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| is bounded from above by
2 ·m · |A|+M · |A|2 · (M + 1) +m · ρ(Γ) · |A| · ((3 + ǫ) ·M + 1)+m · (ρ(Γ) + 1) · |A| ·maxa∈A τa(1)
m · C(f∗, τ)−m · ǫ · |A| · (maxa∈A τa(1) + (3 + ǫ) ·M + 1) ·ǫ,
where m = mina∈Aminx∈[0,1] τ
′
a(x) and M = maxa∈Amaxx∈[0,1] τ
′
a(x).
Theorem 3 yields the same order of approximation as the results by [13] and [34]. Their results hold
with an approximation bound of 1 when all cost functions are polynomials. Our constants are larger
and depend on the cost functions τa(·), but are not limited to polynomials and hold for simultaneous
deviations of demands and cost functions.
4.3 An application to the convergence analysis of the PoA
We will demonstrate in this Section that Theorem 1–Theorem 3 provide also useful tools to analyze
the convergence of the PoA when the total demand T (d) tends to zero or infinity.
4.3.1 The case T (d)→ 0
Consider an arbitrary cost function vector τ = (τa)a∈A ∈ LA s.t. τa(x) > 0 for all pairs (a, x) ∈
A × (0,∞) and let d = (dk)k∈K ∈ RA≥0 be an arbitrary demand vector with T (d) =
∑
k∈K dk > 0. If
τa(0) > 0 for all a ∈ A, then Theorem 1 implies that ρ(τ, d) converges to 1 when the total demand
T (d) approaches 0.
To see this, we consider the scaled game
Γ[T (d)] :=
(
σ[T (d)] =
(
σ[T (d)]a
)
a∈A
:= τ ◦ T (d), d/T (d)
)
∈ Nor(G(K, A,S))
that is obtained by scaling the demand of the game (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S) with factor T (d). Then
σ
[T (d)]
a (x) = τa
(
T (d) ·x) for all pairs (a, x) ∈ A× [0, 1], see Section 3.2. The notation Γ[T (d)] and σ[T (d)]
indicate their dependence on the total demand T (d). Recall that ρ(τ, d) = ρ(Γ[T (d)]) since the PoA is
invariant under demand scaling.
Put τˆa(x) ≡ τa(0) for all pairs (a, x) ∈ A× [0, 1]. Note that there are a limit demand vector d(∞) ∈
RK≥0 and an infinite subsequence (ni)i∈N s.t. limi→∞ d
(ni)/T (d(ni)) = d(∞) for every sequence (d(n))n∈N
with T (d(n)) → 0, see [37] for a detailed explanation of this argument. Then, for each such subse-
quence (ni)i∈N, limi→∞ Γ
[T (d(ni))] = (τˆ , d(∞)) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)) and ρ(τˆ , d(∞)) = 1 since (τˆ , d(∞))
is a well designed game. Since the PoA is continuous, see Theorem 1, we have limi→∞ ρ(τ, d
(ni)) =
limi→∞ ρ(Γ
[T (d(ni))]) = ρ(τˆ , d(∞)) = 1, which in turn implies that limT (d)→0 ρ(τ, d) = 1.
Moreover, if ||σ[T (d)] − τˆ || = maxa∈Amaxx∈[0,1] |τa(T (d) · x)− τa(0)| = maxa∈A |τa(T (d))− τa(0)| ∈
O(T (d)β) for some constant β > 0 (which is the case when all cost functions τa(x) are BPR functions),
then we obtain from Theorem 3a) that |ρ(τ, d)−1| = |ρ(σ[T (d)], d/T (d))−ρ(τˆ , d/T (d))| ∈ O(||σ[T (d)]−
τˆ ||) ⊆ O(T (d)β). We summarize this in Corollary 2 below.
Corollary 2 Consider an arbitrary game (τ, d) ∈ G(K, A,S) s.t. τa(0) > 0 for all resources a ∈ A,
and let T (d) → 0. Then limT (d)→0 ρ(τ, d) = 1. In particular, if |τa(T (d)) − τa(0)| ≤ M1 · T (d)β for
constants M1, β > 0 independent of T (d), then there is a constant M2 > 0 independent of T (d) s.t.
ρ(τ, d) ≤ 1 +M2 · T (d)β when T (d) gets small.
[6] obtained a convergence result similar to Corollary 2. They considered routing games with poly-
nomial cost functions τa(·), and showed that the PoA equals 1+O(T (d)) when the total demand T (d)
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is small and all scaled demands dk/T (d) are positive constants. Corollary 2 implies this convergence
of the PoA to 1 for all cost functions τa(·) with τa(0) > 0 and with a convergence rate of at least
O(T (d)). Moreover, if all cost functions are BPR functions (see [5]), then the convergence rate is of
order O(T (d)β). Herein, β > 0 is the common degree of these BPR functions, which is usually 4 in
practice.
4.3.2 The case T (d)→∞
We now illustrate the application of Theorems 1–2 to the convergence analysis of the PoA when
T (d) → ∞. This is more involved. For this case, [6, 7] demonstrated that the PoA may diverge
when the cost functions are not regularly varying, while [37] showed the convergence of the PoA
to 1 when all cost functions are regularly varying. Moreover, [37] illustrated on a simple routing
game with BPR cost functions that the resulting convergence rate is actually sequence-dependent, i.e.,
ρ(τ, d(n)) = 1 + O(1/T (d)θ) for a constant θ ∈ [β, 2 · β] depending crucially on the demand vector
sequence (d(n))n∈N when limn→∞ T (d
(n)) =∞.
The convergence rate of the PoA for arbitrary regularly varying cost functions (other than poly-
nomials) is still unknown. Here we use our sensitivity results to obtain the first convergence rate for
certain (non-polynomial) regularly varying cost functions.
We thus assume for our result below that all cost functions τa(x) are regularly varying with the
same regularity index β > 0, i.e., limT→∞ τa(T · x)/τa(T ) = xβ, and consider only demand vector
sequences (d(n))n∈N satisfying the condition that
lim
n→∞
T (d(n)) =∞, lim
n→∞
τa(T (d
(n)))
τb(T (d(n)))
=: λa,b ∈ (0,∞) ∀a, b ∈ A,
lim
n→∞
d
(n)
k
T (d(n))
=: d(∞) ∈ [0, 1] ∀k ∈ K.
(4.7)
Karamata’s Characterization Theorem, see, e.g., [4], shows that a regularly varying function τa
has the form τa(x) = Qa(x) · xβ , where Qa(x) is slowly varying, i.e., limT→∞Qa(T · x)/Qa(T ) = 1 for
all x > 0.
To apply Theorems 1–2, we put σ[T (d
(n))] = (σ
[T (d(n))]
a )a∈A, τ
(∞) = (τ
(∞)
a )a∈A, and τ
[T (d(n))] =
(τ
[T (d(n))]
a )a∈A with components defined as
σ[T (d
(n))]
a :=
τa(T (d
(n)) · x)
τa∗(T (d(n)))
=
Qa(T (d
(n)) · x)
Qa∗(T (d(n)))
· xβ ,
τ (∞)a (x) := λa,a∗ · xβ, τ [T (d
n)]
a (x) :=
Qa(T (d
(n)))
Qa∗(T (d(n)))
· xβ
for all (a, x) ∈ A × [0, 1] and an arbitrary resource a∗. Then, ρ(τ, d(n)) = ρ(σ[T (d(n))], d(n)/T (d(n)))
and ρ(τ [T (d
(n))], d(n)/T (d(n))) = ρ(τ (∞), d(∞)) = 1 for all n ∈ N, since (τ [T (d(n))], d(n)/T (d(n))) and
(τ (∞), d(∞)) are well designed. By (4.7), limn→∞(σ
[T (d(n))], d(n)/T (d(n))) = (τ (∞), d(∞)). Thus, Theo-
rem 1 implies that limn→∞ ρ(τ, d
(n)) = limn→∞ ρ(σ
[T (d(n))], d(n)/T (d(n))) = ρ(τ (∞), d(∞)) = 1.
To analyze the convergence rate, we need to bound the distance between games (σ[T (d
(n))], d(n)/T (d(n)))
and (τ [T (d
(n))], d(n)/T (d(n))). Condition (4.7) implies that
lim
n→∞
Qa(T (d
(n)))
Qb(T (d(n)))
∈ (0,∞)
for all a, b ∈ A. Hence, there is a constant M > 0 s.t. Qa(T (d(n)))/Qb(T (d(n))) ≤ M for all a, b ∈ A
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and all n ∈ N. Then
||τ [T (d(n))]−σ[T (d(n))]|| = max
a∈A
max
x∈[0,1]
|τ [T (d(n))]a (x)− σ[T (d
(n))]
a (x)|
= max
a∈A
max
x∈[0,1]
Qa(T (d
(n)))
Qa∗(T (d(n)))
·
∣∣∣Qa(T (d(n)) · x)
Qa(T (d(n)))
− 1
∣∣∣ · xβ
≤M ·max
a∈A
max
x∈[0,1]
∣∣∣Qa(T (d(n)) · x)
Qa(T (d(n)))
− 1
∣∣∣ · xβ =:M · w(n).
(4.8)
Theorem 2 then implies that ρ(τ, d(n)) = 1 + O(
√
w(n)). Herein, we use that the cost functions
τ
[T (d(n))]
a (·) are Lipschitz continuous on [0, 1] with Lipschitz constant M, i.e.,
|τ [T (d(n))]a (x)− τ [T (d
(n))]
a (y)| =
Qa(T (d
(n)))
Qa∗(T (d(n)))
· |xβ − yβ| ≤M · |x− y|
for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], all a ∈ A and all n ∈ N.
When the Qa(x) are of the form
ζa · lnα(x+ 1), ζa > 0, α ≥ 0, (4.9)
then w(n) ∈ O(1/ ln(T (d(n))+1)) and thus ρ(τ, d(n)) = 1+O(
√
1/ ln(T (d(n)) + 1)). This follows since
β > 0 and the function
xβ −
( ln(T (d(n)) · x+ 1)
ln(T (d(n)) + 1)
)α
· xβ, x ∈ [0, 1],
reaches its maximum at a point x ∈ [0, 1] satisfying the equation
lnα(T (d(n)) + 1)− lnα(T (d(n)) · x+ 1) = α
β
· T (d
(n)) · x
T (d(n)) · x+ 1 · ln
α−1(T (d(n)) · x+ 1).
We summarize this in Corollary 3 below.
Corollary 3 Consider a sequence of games (τ, d(n)) ∈ G(K, A,S) s.t. each τa(x) = Qa(x) · xβ is
regularly varying with regularity index β > 0 and condition (4.7) holds. Then limn→∞ ρ(τ, d
(n)) = 1.
Moreover, ρ(τ, d(n)) ∈ 1 + O(√w(n)) with w(n) defined in (4.8). In particular, if the slowly varying
functions Qa(·) have the form in (4.9), then ρ(τ, d(n)) ∈ 1 +O(
√
1/ ln(T (d(n)) + 1)).
5 Summary and discussion
The paper presents the first sensitity analysis for the PoA in non-atomic congestion games when both
the demands and cost functions can change. To achieve this, we have introduced a topology on the
class of games with the same combinatorial structure, which may also be of use for other research
purposes. The PoA, the SO cost, and the NE cost turned out to be continuous functions w.r.t.
that topology, their dependence on small variation of the demands and/or Lipschitz continuous cost
functions is small, and, for the PoA, of the same order as in the previous results by [13], [34] and [9]
for demand deviations only. In summary, the PoA is insensitive to small variations of demands and/or
Lipschitz continuous cost functions.
We have also applied our sensitivity results to analyze the convergence behavior of the PoA when
the total demand T (d) tends to 0 or ∞. They lead to a new short proof that the PoA tends to 1 when
T (d)→ 0, and identify another type of regularly varying functions for which the PoA tends to 1 when
T (d)→∞. In both cases, we have also proved bounds on the convergence rate.
We close our discussion with three open questions below.
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5.1 Is there an “ǫ-approximation” for arbitrary cost functions?
We have shown that there is an “ǫ-approximation” for particular cost functions, i.e., |ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ∈
O(||Γ − Γ′||). However, we have neither been able to confirm this for arbitrary cost functions, nor to
provide a counterexample. We leave this as an open question.
Open Question 1 Is there an ǫ-approximation for general cost functions, i.e., does |C(f˜ , τ)−C(g˜, σ)| ∈
O(ǫ) hold for any two games (τ, d), (σ, d) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)) with ||τ − σ|| ∈ O(ǫ)?
This question is quite important. Lemma 3c) shows that an NE profile f˜ of a game (τ, d) is an
ǫ-approximate NE profile of the game (σ, d), if ||τ − σ|| ∈ O(ǫ). A positive answer to this question
would lead to a better upper bound for the deviation of the cost of an ǫ-approximation NE profile
from that of an NE profile.
5.2 Is there a good characterization of well designed games?
The most general method to identify if a game is asymptotically well designed is to consider if the
sequence of games with growing total demands has a limit game that is well designed, see [37]. If we
knew which games are well designed, then this would facilitate this approach and specific techniques
such as the “asymptotic decomposition” of games ([37]). So far, the only known well designed games
are games with monomials of the same degree.
Open Question 2 Is there a good characterization of well designed games?
If there is, then our sensitivity results combined with the asymptotic decomposition in [37] may
yield an easy method to determine if a game is asymptotically well designed.
5.3 Does the average PoA over all games exist and is it finite?
Every continuous function on a bounded closed interval can be well approximated by a polynomial.
In our terminology, games with polynomial cost functions are dense in Nor(G(K, A,S)). [37] showed
that games with polynomial cost functions are asymptotically well designed, while Corollary 2 shows
that their PoA converges to 1 quickly when the total demand tends to 0.
This means that the PoA for polynomial cost functions is significantly larger than 1 only when the
total demand is moderate. So it seems reasonable to expect that the average PoA over all demands for a
game with polynomial cost functions is finite. The fact that these games are dense in Nor(G(K, A,S))
might then imply a finite average PoA over all games in Nor(G(K, A,S)). We guess that this finite
value (if it exists) equals 1. We leave this as our third open question.
Open Question 3 Is there a finite average PoA over all games? Does it equal 1 if it exists?
To solve Open Question 3, one needs to quantify the size of open balls in the spaceNor(G(K, A,S)).
This will result in a Lebesgue-like measure m on the topological space Nor(G(K, A,S)). This measure
m should be finite and make the map ρ(·) measurable. One can then investigate the integral of ρ(·)
w.r.t. m. This integral is just the average PoA. Our approximation Theorem 2 can be applied to
obtain an upper bound of the PoA on open balls that are small w.r.t. the measure m. This may then
lead to a finite upper bound for the integral.
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A Appendix: Mathematical Proofs
A.1 The proof of Theorem 1
Observe that (τ, d), (τ (n), d(n)) ∈ Nor(G(K, A,S)), and thus ρ(τ, d), ρ(τ (n), d(n)) ∈ [1,∞) exist. This
simple fact is the basis.
Proof of Theorem 1a): We assume w.l.o.g. that limn→∞ f˜
(n) = f˜ (∞). Since limn→∞ d
(n) = d,
f˜ (∞) is a profile of the limit game (τ, d). We show below that it is actually an NE profile of (τ, d).
Consider an arbitrary group k ∈ K with dk > 0 and an two arbitrary strategies s, s′ ∈ Sk s.t.
f˜
(∞)
s > 0. Note that f˜ (∞) is an NE profile if τs(f˜
(∞)) ≤ τs′(f˜ (∞)). This is due to the arbitrary choice
of k, s and s′. Clearly, limn→∞ f˜
(n)
a = limn→∞
∑
s′′∈S: a∈s′′ f˜
(n)
s′′ = f˜
(∞)
a =
∑
s′′∈S: a∈s′′ f˜
(∞)
s′′ for each
a ∈ A. The continuity and the monotonicity of cost functions then imply that limn→∞ τ (n)a (f˜ (n)a ) =
τa(f˜
(∞)
a ) for each a ∈ A. Herein, we use the property that limn→∞ τ (n)a (x) = τa(x) for all pairs
(a, x) ∈ A × R≥0. Hence, τs(f˜ (∞)) = limn→∞ τ (n)s (f˜ (n)), and τs′(f˜ (∞)) = limn→∞ τ (n)s′ (f˜ (n)). The
inequality τs(f˜
(∞)) ≤ τs′(f˜ (∞)) follows since f˜ (n)s > 0 for n large enough, and since NE profiles fulfill
(2.2).
Proof of Theorem 1c): It follows directly from Theorem 1a) and the essential uniqueness of NE
profiles.
Proof of Theorem 1b): We assume again w.l.o.g. that limn→∞ f
∗(n) = f∗(∞). Similar to
the proof for Theorem 1a), f∗(∞) is a profile of the limit game (τ, d). We prove Theorem 1b) by
contradiction and assume that there is a profile f = (fs)s∈S of (τ, d) with C(f, τ) < C(f˜
(∞), τ).
Clearly, limn→∞ τ
(n)
a (f
∗(n)
a ) = τ
(∞)
a (f
∗(∞)
a ) for all a ∈ A, and thus limn→∞C(f∗(n), τ (n)) = C(f∗(∞), τ).
This follows again since limn→∞ f
∗(n) = f∗(∞), and since the cost functions are continuous and mon-
tone.
We now construct for each game (τ (n), d(n)) a profile f (n) s.t. limn→∞ f
(n) = f.Then limn→∞C(f
(n), τ (n)) =
C(f, τ) < C(f∗(∞), τ) = limn→∞C(f
∗(n), τ (n)), and so C(f (n), τ (n)) < C(f∗(n), τ (n)) for n large
enough. This contradicts the fact that f∗(n) is an SO profile of the game (τ (n), d(n)).
To construct f (n), let N > 0 be an integer fulfilling mins′∈S: fs′>0 fs′ > maxk∈K |dk−d
(n)
k | for each
n > N. Clearly, such an integer N exists, because limn→∞ d
(n) = d and so limn→∞maxk∈K |dk−d(n)k | =
0. For each k ∈ K and each s ∈ Sk, put
f (n)s :=


fs +
d
(n)
k
−dk
|Sk|
if d
(n)
k ≥ dk,
fs if d
(n)
k < dk, fs = 0,
fs − dk−d
(n)
k
|Sk|
if d
(n)
k < dk, fs > 0,
(A.1)
for each n > N, and let f (n) be an arbitrary profile of the game (τ (n), d(n)) for n ≤ N. Then (A.1)
implies that f (n) converges to the profile f.
Proof of Theorem 1d): It follows directly from Theorem 1a)–c). 
A.2 The proof of Lemma 3
Note that games (τ, d) and (σ, d) have the same profiles. Their total demand T (d) = 1 and their
resource consumption is fa =
∑
s∈S: a∈s fs ∈ [0, 1] for every profile f and every resource a ∈ A.
Proof of Lemma 3a): The condition that |τa(x) − σa(x)| < ǫ for all pairs (a, x) ∈ A × [0, 1]
implies that
C(f∗, τ) ≤ C(g∗, τ) =
∑
a∈A
g∗a · τa(g∗a) ≤ C(g∗, σ) + ǫ ·
∑
a∈A
g∗a ≤ C(g∗, σ) + ǫ · |A|,
where we observe that f∗ minimizes C(f, τ). Similarly, one obtains C(g∗, σ) ≤ C(f∗, τ) + ǫ · |A|.
Proof of Lemma 3b): Clearly, |Φ(f, τ)−Φ(f, σ)| ≤ ǫ ·∑a∈A fa ≤ ǫ · |A| for an arbitrary profile
f for the demand vector d, when ||τ − σ|| = ǫ. So, Φ(f˜ , τ) ≥ Φ(f˜ , σ) − ǫ · |A| ≥ Φ(g˜, σ) − ǫ · |A|,
and similarly Φ(g˜, σ) ≥ Φ(f˜ , τ) − ǫ · |A|. Thus |Φ(f˜ , τ) − Φ(g˜, σ)| ≤ ǫ · |A|. This in turn implies
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that |Φ(g˜, τ) − Φ(f˜ , τ)| ≤ |Φ(g˜, τ) − Φ(g˜, σ)| + |Φ(g˜, σ) − Φ(f˜ , τ)| ≤ 2 · ǫ · |A|. Similarly, we have
|Φ(g˜, σ)− Φ(f˜ , σ)| ≤ 2 · ǫ · |A|.
Proof of Lemma 3c): Consider now an arbitrary profile f. Then
∑
a∈A σa(f˜) · (fa − f˜a) =∑
a∈A τa(f˜a) ·(fa− f˜a)+
∑
a∈A(σa(f˜a)−τa(f˜a)) ·(fa− f˜a) ≥
∑
a∈A(σa(f˜a)−τa(f˜a)) ·(fa− f˜a) ≥ −ǫ · |A|.
Herein, we observe that f˜ is an NE profile of (τ, d), and thus
∑
a∈A τa(f˜a) · (fa − f˜a) ≥ 0. This shows
that f˜ is an ǫ · |A|-approximate NE profile of game (σ, d). Similarly, g˜ is an ǫ · |A|-approximate NE
profile of game (τ, d).
Proof of Lemma 3d): With Lemma 1c), we obtain |τa(f˜a)− τa(g˜a)| ≤
√
M · ǫ · |A| for all a ∈ A,
when all τa(·) are Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant M > 0. Lemma 1b) implies that
0 ≤∑a∈A τa(g˜a) · (g˜a − f˜a) ≤ ǫ · |A|, since g˜ is an ǫ · |A|-approximate NE profile of (τ, d). Therefore,
|C(f˜ , τ)−C(g˜, σ)| = ∣∣∑
a∈A
(
τa(f˜a) · f˜a − σa(g˜a) · g˜a
)∣∣
≤
∑
a∈A
∣∣τa(f˜a)− τa(g˜a)∣∣ · f˜a + ∣∣∣∑
a∈A
τa(g˜a) · (f˜a − g˜a)
∣∣∣+∑
a∈A
∣∣τa(g˜a)− σa(g˜a)∣∣ · g˜a
≤
√
M · ǫ · |A|3 + ǫ · |A|+ ǫ · |A| =
√
M · ǫ · |A|3 + 2 · ǫ · |A|.
(A.2)
Combining (A.2) and Lemma 3a) yields
|ρ(σ, d) − ρ(τ, d)| ≤
√
M · ǫ · |A|3 + (2 + ρ(τ, d)) · ǫ · |A|
C(f∗, τ)− ǫ · |A| ∈ O
(√
M · ǫ · |A|3
C(f∗, τ)
)
when ǫ is small. Here, we used that ρ(τ, d) ≥ 1 and C(f∗, τ) > 0 are constants independent of ǫ. 
A.3 The proof of Lemma 4
We first introduce a trivial but helpful fact.
Define dˆk = min{dk, d′k} for each k ∈ K. Since
∑
k∈K |dk − d′k| = ǫ, we obtain the inequalities
0 ≤ T (d) − T (dˆ) ≤ ǫ, 0 ≤ T (d′) − T (dˆ) ≤ ǫ, 0 ≤ dk − dˆk ≤ ǫ and 0 ≤ d′k − dˆk ≤ ǫ for each k ∈ K.
Therefore, every profile f = (fs)s∈S of game (τ, d) can be represented as a sum of a profile µ = (µs)s∈S
of game (τ, d − dˆ) and a profile f − µ = (fs − µs)s∈S of game (τ|µ, dˆ) with τ|µ := (τa|µ(·))a∈A and
τa|µ(x) := τa(x+ µa) = τa(x+
∑
s∈S: a∈s µs) for each pair (a, x) ∈ A× [0, T (dˆ)]. Clearly, τa|µ(·) is just
the resulting cost function of resource a ∈ A given the joint consumption µa by profile µ.
A similar representation applies to any profile f ′ of game (τ, d′).
We summarize this in Fact 1 below.
f˜ : (τ, d)
µ˜ : (τ, d − dˆ)
f˜ − µ˜ : (τ|µ˜, dˆ) g˜ − λ˜ : (τ|λ˜, dˆ)
g˜ : (τ, d′)
λ˜ : (τ, d′ − dˆ)
µ˜
τs(f˜) = τs|µ˜(f˜ − µ˜)
2 ·M · |A| · ǫ-approximate
|τs(f˜)− τs(g˜)| ≤
√
2 ·M2 · |A|3 · ǫ τs(g˜) = τs|λ˜(g˜ − λ˜)
λ˜|C(f˜ , d)−C(g˜, d′)| ≤
√
2 ·M2 · |A|3 · ǫ+ǫ ·maxk∈K Lk(τ, d)
Figure 4: Roadmap for bounding the cost difference of NE profiles
Fact 1 For each profile f of the game (τ, d), there is a profile µ = (µs)s∈S of the game (τ, d − dˆ)
such that 0 ≤ µs ≤ fs for all s ∈ S. Moreover, τa|µ(fa − µa) = τa(fa) for each a ∈ A, and thus
τs(f) = τs|µ(f − µ) :=
∑
b∈A: b∈s τb|µ(fb − µb) =
∑
b∈A: b∈s τb(fb) for each s ∈ S. Similar statements
hold for an arbitrary profile f ′ of game (τ, d′).
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Proof of Fact 1. Trivial. 
Proof of Lemma 4a): We now prove Lemma 4a) using Fact 1 and the roadmap in Figure 4.
Fact 1 implies that there are a profile µ˜ = (µ˜s)s∈S of game (τ, d − dˆ) and a profile λ˜ = (λ˜s)s∈S of
game (τ, d′ − dˆ) s.t. µ˜s ∈ [0, f˜s] and λ˜s ∈ [0, g˜s] for each s ∈ S, see Figure 4. Put τ|µ˜ := (τa|µ˜)a∈A and
τ|λ˜ := (τa|λ˜)a∈A with τa|µ˜(x) := τa(x+ µ˜a) and τa|λ˜(x) := τa(x+ λ˜a) for each a ∈ A.
With Fact 1, we can easily show that f˜ − µ˜ and g˜− λ˜ are NE profiles of games (τ|µ˜, dˆ) and (τ|λ˜, dˆ),
respectively, since f˜ and g˜ are NE profiles of games (τ, d) and (τ, d′), respectively. We summarize this
in Fact 2 below.
Fact 2 f˜ − µ˜ and g˜ − λ˜ are NE profiles of games (τ|µ˜, dˆ) and (τ|λ˜, dˆ), respectively.
Proof of Fact 2. We prove only that f˜− µ˜ is an NE profile of game (τ, dˆ). A similar argument applies
to profile g˜ − λ˜.
Consider k ∈ K with dˆk > 0, and s, s′ ∈ Sk with f˜s− µ˜s > 0. Fact 1 implies that τs(f˜) = τs|µ˜(f˜− µ˜)
and τs′(f˜) = τs′|µ˜(f˜ − µ˜). Clearly, f˜s > µ˜s ≥ 0. Thus τs|µ˜(f˜ − µ˜) = τs(f˜) ≤ τs′|µ˜(f˜ − µ˜) = τs′(f˜), since
f˜ is an NE profile of game (τ, d). This means that f˜ − µ˜ is an NE profile because of the arbitrary
choice of k, s and s′. 
Since all τa(·) are Lipschitz continuous on [0, 1] with Lipschitz constant M > 0, |τa|µ˜(x)−τa|λ˜(x)| =
|τa(x+ µ˜a)−τa(x+ λ˜a)| ≤M · |µ˜a− λ˜a| ≤M ·(µ˜a+ λ˜a) =M ·
∑
s∈S: a∈s(µ˜s+ λ˜s) ≤M ·
∑
s∈S(µ˜s+ λ˜s) =
M · (T (d) + T (d′) − 2 · T (dˆ)) ≤ 2 ·M · ǫ for each a ∈ A. This, together with Lemma 3c) and Fact 2,
implies that f˜ − µ˜ is a 2 ·M · |A| · ǫ-approximate NE profile of game (τ|λ˜, dˆ), and that g˜ − λ˜ is a
2 ·M · |A| · ǫ-approximate NE profile of game (τ|µ˜, dˆ), where we observe that games (τ|µ˜, dˆ) and (τ|λ˜, dˆ)
differ only in their cost functions. Using Lemma 1, we then obtain that |τa|µ˜(f˜a− µ˜a)−τa|λ˜(g˜a− λ˜a)| ≤√
2 ·M2 · |A| · ǫ for each a ∈ A. We summarize this in Fact 3 below.
Fact 3 f˜ − µ˜ is a 2 ·M · |A| · ǫ-approximate NE profile of game (τ|λ˜, dˆ) and g˜ − λ˜ is a 2 ·M · |A| · ǫ-
approximate NE profile of game (τ|µ˜, dˆ). Moreover, |τa(f˜a)− τa(g˜a)| = |τa|µ˜(f˜a− µ˜a)− τa|λ˜(g˜a− λ˜a)| ≤√
2 ·M2 · |A| · ǫ for each a ∈ A.
Using Fact 3, we obtain that |τs(f˜) − τs(g˜)| ≤
√
2 ·M2 · |A|3 · ǫ for each k ∈ K and each s ∈ Sk,
which in turn implies that |Lk(τ, d)−Lk(τ, d′)| ≤
√
2 ·M2 · |A|3 · ǫ for each k ∈ K. Herein, Lk(τ, d) =
mins∈Sk τs(f˜) and Lk(τ, d
′) = mins∈Sk τs(g˜) are the user cost of group k ∈ K for NE profiles f˜ and g˜,
respectively. Therefore, we obtain that
|C(f˜ , d)−C(g˜, d′)| ≤
∑
k∈K
|Lk(τ, d) − Lk(τ, d′)| · d′k +
∑
k∈K
Lk(τ, d) · |dk − d′k|
≤
√
2 ·M2 · |A|3 · ǫ+ ǫ ·max
k∈K
Lk(τ, d).
This proves Lemma 4a).
Proof of Lemma 4b): Because of Fact 1, there are a profile µ∗ = (µ∗s)s∈S of game (τ, d− dˆ) and
a profile λ∗ = (λ∗s)s∈S of game (τ, d
′ − dˆ) such that 0 ≤ µ∗s ≤ f∗s and 0 ≤ λ∗s ≤ g∗s for each s ∈ S.
Clearly, f∗ − µ∗ and g∗ − λ∗ are profiles of game (τ, dˆ). Let h∗ be an SO profile of game (τ, dˆ). Then
we obtain C(h∗, τ) ≤ C(f∗−µ∗, τ) =∑a∈A τa(f∗a −µ∗a) · (f∗a −µ∗a) ≤ C(f∗, τ) =∑a∈A τa(f∗a ) · f∗a and
C(h∗, τ) ≤ C(g∗ − λ∗, τ) =∑a∈A τa(g∗a − λ∗a) · (g∗a − λ∗a) ≤ C(g∗, τ) =∑a∈A τa(g∗a) · g∗a.
Note that h∗ + µ∗ and h∗ + λ∗ are profiles of games (τ, d) and (τ, d′), respectively. So C(h∗, τ) ≤
C(f∗, τ) ≤ C(h∗ + µ∗, τ) and C(h∗, τ) ≤ C(g∗, τ) ≤ C(h∗ + λ∗, τ). Hence, we have
|C(f∗, τ)− C(g∗, τ)| ≤ max
{
C(h∗ + µ∗, τ)− C(h∗, τ), C(h∗ + λ∗, τ)− C(h∗, τ)
}
. (A.3)
Note also that |τa(h∗a)− τa(h∗a+µ∗a)| ≤M · ǫ for each a ∈ A, since τa(·) is Lipschitz continuous and
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µ∗a ≤ T (d)− T (dˆ) ≤ ǫ. Therefore, we obtain that
C(h∗ + µ∗, τ)− C(h∗, τ) =
∑
a∈A
(
τa(h
∗
a + µ
∗
a) · (h∗a + µ∗a)− τa(h∗a) · h∗a
)
=
∑
a∈A
τa(h
∗
a + µ
∗
a) · µ∗a +
∑
a∈A
(
τa(h
∗
a + µ
∗
a)− τa(h∗a)
)
· h∗a ≤ ǫ ·
∑
a∈A
τa(h
∗
a + ǫ) + |A| ·M · ǫ
≤ ǫ ·
∑
a∈A
(
τa(f
∗
a ) +M · |f∗a − h∗a − ǫ|
)
+ |A| ·M · ǫ ≤ ǫ ·
∑
a∈A
τa(f
∗
a ) + (3 + ǫ) · |A| ·M · ǫ.
(A.4)
Herein, we observe that |f∗a − h∗a − ǫ| ≤ f∗a + h∗a + ǫ ≤ 2 + ǫ. Similarly, we obtain that C(h∗ + λ∗, τ)−
C(h∗, τ) ≤ ǫ ·∑a∈A τa(f∗a ) + (3 + ǫ) · |A| ·M · ǫ.
Altogether, we have |C(f∗, τ) − C(g∗, τ)| ≤ ǫ ·∑a∈A τa(f∗a ) + (3 + ǫ) · |A| ·M · ǫ. This completes
the proof of Lemma 4b).
Proof of Lemma 4c) It follows immediately from Lemma 4a)–b). 
A.4 The proof of Theorem 3
Let f˜ , g˜ and h˜ be NE profiles of games Γ = (τ, d), Γ′ = (σ, d′) and Γˆ = (τ, d′), respectively, and let
f∗, g∗ and h∗ be SO profiles of games Γ = (τ, d), Γ′ = (σ, d′) and Γˆ = (τ, d′), respectively. Then
||Γ− Γ′|| = ǫ yields that ||Γ− Γˆ|| ≤ ǫ and ||Γ′ − Γˆ|| ≤ ǫ.
Clearly, cost functions in Theorem 3a)–b) are Lipschitz continuous on the compact interval [0, 1].
So there is a constant M ≥ 0 such that |τa(x) − τb(y)| ≤ M · |x − y| for all triples (a, x, y) ∈
A × [0, 1]2. Feasible values of M are M = 0 for Theorem 3a), and M = maxa∈Amaxx∈[0,1] τ ′a(x) > 0
for Theorem 3b).
Lemma 3a) implies that |C(h∗, τ)−C(g∗, σ)| ≤ |A|·ǫ, since h∗ and g∗ are SO profiles of games (τ, d′)
and (σ, d′), respectively. Similarly, Lemma 4b) implies that |C(f∗, τ)− C(h∗, τ)| ≤ ǫ ·∑a∈A τa(f∗a ) +
(3 + ǫ) · |A| ·M · ǫ ≤ ǫ · |A| · (maxa∈A τa(1) + (3 + ǫ) ·M), since f∗ and h∗ are SO profiles of games
(τ, d) and (τ, d′), respectively. Altogether, we obtain that
|C(f∗, τ)−C(g∗, σ)| ≤ ǫ · |A| · (max
a∈A
τa(1) + (3 + ǫ) ·M + 1
)
, (A.5)
where we recall that M = 0 for Theorem 3a) and M = maxa∈Amaxx∈[0,1] τ
′
a(x) for Theorem 3b).
With (A.5), we now prove Theorem 3a)–b), respectively.
Proof of Theorem 3a):
(A.2) implies that |C(h˜, τ)−C(g˜, σ)| ≤ 2 · ǫ · |A|, since all τa(x) are constant and h˜ and g˜ are NE
profiles of games (τ, d′) and (σ, d′), respectively.
Clearly, mins∈Sk τs(f˜) = mins∈Sk τs(h˜) ≤ |A| · maxa∈A τa(1) for each k ∈ K, since all τa(x) are
constant. So we obtain that |C(h˜, τ) − C(f˜ , τ)| ≤ ǫ · |A| ·maxa∈A τa(1), since ||Γ− Γˆ|| ≤ ǫ, and since
f˜ and h˜ are NE profiles of games Γ = (τ, d) and Γ′ = (τ, d′), respectively. Therefore,
|C(f˜ , τ)− C(g˜, σ)| ≤ ǫ · |A| · (max
a∈A
τa(1) + 2
)
. (A.6)
Using M = 0, (A.5) and (A.6), we obtain that
|ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ≤ C(f˜ , τ) + ǫ · |A| ·
(
maxa∈A τa(1) + 2
)
C(f∗, τ)− ǫ · |A| · (maxa∈A τa(1) + 1) −
C(f˜ , τ)
C(f∗, τ)
≤
ǫ · |A| ·
(
C(f˜ , τ) · (maxa∈A τa(1) + 1)+ C(f∗, τ) · (maxa∈A τa(1) + 2))
C(f∗, τ) ·
(
C(f∗, τ)− ǫ · |A| · (maxa∈A τa(1) + 1))
=
|A| · (2 ·maxa∈A τa(1) + 3)
C(f∗, τ)− ǫ · |A| · (maxa∈A τa(1) + 1) · ǫ.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3a).
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Proof of Theorem 3b): Define m := mina∈Aminx∈[0,1] τ
′
a(x). Then we have
0 < m · |x− y| ≤ |τa(x)− τa(y)| ≤M · |x− y| for all triples (a, x, y) ∈ A× [0, 1]2. (A.7)
||Γ′ − Γˆ|| < ǫ and Lemma 3c) together imply that h˜ is an ǫ · |A|-approximate NE profile of game
Γ′ = (σ, d′) and g˜ is an ǫ · |A|-approximate NE profile of game Γˆ = (τ, d′), since h˜ and g˜ are NE profiles
of games Γˆ and Γ′, respectively. Using (4.3), we then obtain that
0 ≤
∑
a∈A
(
τa(g˜a)− τa(h˜a)
) · (g˜a − h˜a) ≤∑
a∈A
(
σa(g˜a)− τa(g˜a)
) · (h˜a − g˜a) ≤ ǫ ·∑
a∈A
∣∣h˜a − g˜a∣∣. (A.8)
Define a∗ = argmaxa∈A |h˜a − g˜a|. Inequalities (A.8) and (A.7) imply that
|h˜a − g˜a| ≤ |h˜a∗ − g˜a∗ | ≤ 1
m
· |τa∗(h˜a∗)− τa∗(g˜a∗)| ≤ |A|
m
· ǫ
for all a ∈ A. Using (A.7) again, we obtain |τa(h˜a)− τa(g˜a)| ≤ M ·|A|m · ǫ for all a ∈ A. (A.2) then yields
that
|C(h˜, τ)− C(g˜, σ)| ≤
(
2 · |A|+ M · |A|
2
m
)
· ǫ (A.9)
Define dˆk = min{dk, d′k} for each k ∈ K, and put dˆ = (dˆk)k∈K. Fact 1 implies that there are a
profile µ˜ = (µ˜s)s∈S of game (τ, d− dˆ) and a profile λ˜ = (λ˜s)s∈S of game (τ, d′ − dˆ) s.t. µ˜s ∈ [0, f˜s] and
λ˜s ∈ [0, h˜s] for all s ∈ S.
With an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4a), we obtain that h˜− λ˜ is an ǫ ·M · |A|-
approximate NE profile of game (τ|µ˜, dˆ) and f˜ − µ˜ is an ǫ ·M · |A|-approximate NE profile of game
(τ|λ˜, dˆ). Fact 1, inequalities (4.3) and (A.7) together then imply that
|τa(h˜a)− τa(f˜a)| = |τa|λ˜(h˜a − λ˜a)− τa|µ˜(f˜a − µ˜a)| ≤
M2 · |A|
m
· ǫ.
Hence |τs(f˜)− τs(h˜)| ≤ M
2·|A|2
m · ǫ for all s ∈ S, and thus∣∣min
s∈Sk
τs(f˜)− min
s∈Sk
τs(h˜)
∣∣ ≤ M2 · |A|2
m
· ǫ (A.10)
for all k ∈ K. With (A.10), we obtain that
|C(f˜ , τ)− C(h˜, τ)| =
∣∣∣∑
k∈K
Lk(τ, d) · dk −
∑
k∈K
Lk(τ, d
′) · d′k
∣∣∣
≤
∑
k∈K
|Lk(τ, d) − Lk(τ, d′)| · d′k +
∑
k∈K
Lk(τ, d) · |dk − d′k|
≤ M
2 · |A|2
m
· ǫ+ ǫ · |A| ·max
a∈A
τa(1).
(A.11)
(A.9) and (A.11) then yield that
|C(f˜ , τ)− C(g˜, σ)| ≤
(
2 · |A|+ M · |A|
2
m
+
M2 · |A|2
m
+ |A| ·max
a∈A
τa(1)
)
· ǫ. (A.12)
This, together with (A.5), implies that
|ρ(Γ)− ρ(Γ′)| ≤
C(f˜ , τ) +
(
2 · |A|+ M ·|A|2m + M
2·|A|2
m + |A| ·maxa∈A τa(1)
)
· ǫ
C(f∗, τ)− ǫ · |A| · (maxa∈A τa(1) + (3 + ǫ) ·M + 1) −
C(f˜ , τ)
C(f∗, τ)
=
ǫ
m · C(f∗, τ)−m · ǫ · |A| · (maxa∈A τa(1) + (3 + ǫ) ·M + 1) ·
[
2 ·m · |A|+
M · |A|2 · (M + 1) +m · ρ(Γ) · |A| · ((3 + ǫ) ·M + 1)+m · (ρ(Γ) + 1) · |A| ·max
a∈A
τa(1)
]
.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3b). 
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